This paper offers a multidisciplinary approach to the study of the current armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine as a way of understanding the dispute and the failure of the warring parties to broker a lasting peace. It examines the ideological background to the conflict by considering the most significant historical myths that inform both sides, especially the myths surrounding the medieval state of Kievan Rus', and the religious, political and linguistic elements of those myths that contribute to mutual misunderstanding and heightened tensions. What is demonstrated is that the myths of each side are structurally very similar: one set is the mirror image of the other (with corresponding labels interchanged). This symmetry helps to intensify and maintain inflamed confrontation, so that there is a pressing need to move beyond these myths, if a lasting peace is to be achieved.
Introduction
Early in 2014 fighting broke out in Eastern Ukraine. Today the conflict continues. In the war between the armed forces of the Ukrainian government and the Russian-speaking combatants over seven thousand people have been killed. High-level negotiations have been held between Russia and Ukraine, assisted by some Western powers, but the resulting ceasefire has not been fully maintained. The situation appears intractable. A lasting peace remains elusive, as various interested parties seek a military, rather than a diplomatic solution. What is the purpose of the fighting? What beliefs about the past reinforce the conflict and make its resolution appear remote? How can peace be restored?
In the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine the grievances on both sides are many and complex, and as in any conflict they have arisen in a certain historical context. They often relate to the Soviet past and the period of post-Soviet independence. It should be remembered that Western Ukraine, the centre of Ukrainian nationalism and the heart of Ukrainian Catholicism, had never formed part of the Russian Empire and was incorporated into the Soviet Union only after the Second World War. Armed resistance to Soviet rule in Western Ukraine continued for several years after 1945. On the other hand Eastern Ukraine, the industrial core of the country, became part of the Soviet Union soon after the Russian revolution and civil war. In the case of ethnic Ukrainians the Soviet period is generally regarded as a time when their language and culture were brutally suppressed by the Soviet state centred in Moscow, while for Russian-speakers of Eastern Ukraine it is the post-Soviet period that is largely associated with a threat to their identity through the implementation of Ukrainian nationalist policies by the central government in Kiev.
In order to make some sense of the war we must go beyond a superficial (and possibly misleading) analysis to take account of the historical context. To do so we shall examine the way in which certain key aspects of the past, including the religious past, have been interpreted and construed on both sides, paying close attention to the semantics of the language used in this construction. Our aim is not to rewrite history, but rather to give meaning to the way in which history has been used to support divergent points of view and inflame confrontation. What is intended is a deeper understanding rather than a definitive judgement.
Here it must be noted that there is no consensus among commentators on the immediate causes of the conflict: there are widely divergent interpretations that reflect the extreme complexity of its origins. One recent study that provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the evolution of the dispute in its national and international context is that of the English scholar of Polish descent, Richard Sakwa, in his lengthy monograph In his work Sakwa is concerned not only with the content of the various arguments about the conflict and its origins, but also with the way in which the discussion is conducted. He pleads for an open dialogical approach in contrast to the closed axiological one that characterizes much of the debate. For the axiological position assumes a fixed interpretation beyond critical analysis and excludes the possibility of meaningful compromise.
1 Axiological statements rest on the assumption that the reasons for the conflict are entirely unambiguous. It can therefore be discussed in categorical terms. The notion that there might be any contentious matters of interpretation is rejected completely.
Since the focus of our investigation rests on the ideological background to the dispute, it is inevitable that we engage with problems associated with nationalism and national identity. In doing so we conform to the conceptual framework developed by the outstanding theorist of nationalism, Anthony Smith, the author of numerous acclaimed studies in the field. What we are concerned with in this investigation is observing a specific conflict and assessing the implications of the related ideologies for a peaceful resolution. At the same time the way in which the observations correlate with existing theories, in the sense of confirming or refuting aspects of those theories, is significant. 
Historical myths
Underlying the grievances on both sides are narratives or historical myths that reinforce the sense of injustice. These myths relate to fundamental aspects of the political and religious past, offering each side an apparently indisputable basis for the idea of the nation. The most significant concern the medieval period and the state of Kievan Rus' that had a defining role in the formation of the political, religious and cultural life of Eastern Europe. Such myths are deep-seated and long-standing. Though they cannot be taken as the direct cause of the conflict, their influence is strong, especially on politicians and advocates of the fighting.
The use of the term myth in this context is not intended in any way to be derogatory.
It should not convey the notion of an imagined story or be seen to refer to the fictional character of a narrative. Myths provide meaningful accounts of the past that serve to remind the present generation of important aspects of their history. They have a significant function as shared recollections binding the community together. They serve as prominent markers of identity.
At the same time it is vital to recognize that the matter of the historical accuracy of a myth is not of primary importance. It is secondary to the function of the myth within the community, which bears only an indirect relationship to its veracity. In some cases distinct myths can arise from the same episode or period in history in reference to different groups.
Each myth may be true in some sense: what is missing from each may create the distinctness.
Historical myths exist in all national groups. They are shared stories that create a sense of belonging, mark the limits of inclusiveness and, more significantly, identify those that stand outside the group. They have an emotional appeal: they function primarily as matters of belief. They are not generally matters of intellectual inquiry. What makes historical myths problematic is not some apparent inaccuracy, but rather support for a view of the world that fails to take account of the perspective of those beyond the community to which the myths relate. In many cases what is not stated in a myth forms a significant part of its message and has implications as serious as those that flow from what is stated explicitly.
Historical myths ignore what may be called the principle of conditionality that affirms the conditional existence of every community. 3 In times of conflict this aspect becomes acute, as opposing sides strengthen their resolve to prevail by appealing to their myths.
The use of the term myth to denote a narrative that functions as an element of a system of beliefs is neither new nor revolutionary. It runs counter to the popular understanding of the term that sees myths as inherently fictional, but is consistent with the approach to myths that is taken by many scholars. Here one might mention the writings of Carl Gustav Jung, one of the founders of modern psychiatry, whose investigations of myths play a central role in his exploration of the psyche. In his account of the psyche published in 1927 Jung describes the collective unconscious in the following terms:
The collective unconscious-so far as we can say anything about it at allappears to consist of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which reason the myths of all nations are its real exponents. In fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious. In the extensive and diffuse literature on the subject of nationalism the importance of historical myths as elements of the nationalist narrative is often stressed, but not uniformly.
One leading theorist who argues strongly for recognition of the significance of myths in the creation of a nationalist ideology is Anthony Smith, mentioned above. In his detailed and comprehensive critique of theories of nationalism, entitled Nationalism and Modernism, first published in 1998, he writes:
The nationalist appeal to the past is therefore not only an exaltation of and summons to the people, but a rediscovery by alienated intelligentsias of an entire ethnic heritage and of a living community of presumed ancestry and history. The rediscovery of the ethnic past furnishes vital memories, values, symbols and myths, without which nationalism would be powerless. But these myths, symbols, values and memories have popular resonance because they are founded on living traditions of the people (or segments thereof) which serve both to unite and differentiate them from their neighbours. This unity is in turn based on the powerful myth of a presumed common ancestry and shared historical memories. 6 In passing it can be observed that only one nation-state has made a conscious and explicit attempt to eschew its historical myths and to refrain from exploiting them in the national interest. That country is Germany which officially proclaimed the end of the Second World War as the beginning of the first year of its new history and whose past before that date is treated with the utmost care. A similar position has not been adopted elsewhere, so that, for example, the end of the Soviet Union did not mark a sharp discontinuity in the historiography of Russia.
Problems of language
Here it needs to be stressed that any careful investigation of the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine must be sensitive to matters of language. Even the choice of words to describe the combatants in the fighting raises difficulties. Such terms as separatist, rebel, insurgent, terrorist, and so on all convey a particular point of view. In general, problems of language are closely connected with the situation in Ukraine: matters of semantics, phraseology and linguistic orientation play an important role in the dispute.
To understand the conflict more fully we must take account of the differences in the semantic structures of Russian, Ukrainian, and English. It is not always possible to find a single term in one of the three languages that corresponds exactly to an equivalent term in the other two. In some important cases the meanings of semantically close terms overlap, but do not coincide. Each language has its own semantic structure that differs somewhat from the structures of the other two. These differences have the potential to intensify mutual incomprehension.
An excellent example of semantic distinctness is given by comparing some simple sentences and phrases in Russian and Ukrainian. Consider the well-known Russian saying, or does it refer more broadly to Old Russian in opposition to modern Russian, as in the phrase drevnerusskaia literatura that is often used in relation to texts written before the eighteenth century?)
Kiev
In considering matters of language we need also to address questions of orthography and transliteration in English, since the way in which such questions are resolved may be regarded by some as an indication of a biased approach to Russian or to Ukrainian. Thus it is important to note that the spelling 'Kiev' given above in the English translation should not be seen as partisan in relation to Russian and Ukrainian. It needs to be taken merely as the more established spelling in English, even if 'Kyiv' better reflects the spelling of the name of the city in Ukrainian. (The same applies to the spelling 'Kievan' as opposed to 'Kyivan'.)
Similarly, 'Cologne' is the established name in English corresponding to 'Köln' in German.
Numerous other examples might be added.
Historical myths of Russia and Ukraine: KievanRus'
Central to any discussion of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the historical myths that underlie that conflict must be the matter of Kievan Rus' (Russian Kievskaia Rus', Ukrainian
Kyïvs'ka Rus'). For the myths surrounding Kievan Rus', both Russian and Ukrainian, generate enormous and profound tensions between the conceptions on each side of the historical basis of the two nations, Russia and Ukraine. These myths are concerned with fundamental aspects of the political and religious past. Furthermore, they are well-known, occupy a prominent place in Russian and Ukrainian historiography, and exert considerable political influence.
Kievan Rus' was a significant medieval state centred on Kiev that played a defining role in the development of the political, religious and cultural life of Eastern Europe. It witnessed the official acceptance of Christianity in 988 with the baptism of the ruler, Prince
Vladimir/Volodymyr, an event that changed forever the cultural and religious history of the Eastern Slavs. Kievan Rus' collapsed and ceased to exist as an independent state in the thirteenth century after the sacking of Kiev by the Tatars in 1240.
While the territory of Kievan Rus' at its most extensive corresponded largely to territory within modern Ukraine, the two were far from coterminous. The boundaries of Kievan Rus' were distinct. For example, cities such as Novgorod and Vladimir, and the territory attached, that were never considered part of Ukraine, but came to be regarded as Russian, also formed part of Kievan Rus' in the medieval period. At the time when Kievan
Rus' was an active state, neither Ukraine nor Russia existed as such (in the same way that
England did not exist at the time of Roman Britain).
The collapse and annihilation of Kievan Rus' destroyed the continuity of gradual political development in Eastern Europe. But it left a rich and powerful legacy. The Russian state, as it emerged after the period of Tatar domination, was keen to claim this patrimony, both political and religious, and came to rely on Kievan Rus' more and more strongly as the centre of its construction of statehood. The Ukrainian national movement, as it reached maturity in the nineteenth century, made similar claims for the independent state it advocated.
The Russian and Ukrainian historical myths embodied these ideas without reservation.
Kievan Rus' now serves as the pre-eminent historical symbol of the nation in Russia In this context it should be remembered that in the period before the First World War, when he was writing Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy, Hrushevs'kyi was confronted with a difficult political situation in which the Ukrainian people lacked an independent state, as they had for much of their history. He was therefore compelled to draw on the past, if he wished to
give the idea of Ukrainian statehood solidity and historical precedent. But his task, as he saw it, was not just to construct a narrative of the past; it was also to project a vision of statehood into the future. Karamzin, on the other hand, was writing at a time when the Russian state was already firmly established, as it had been for centuries.
Despite these circumstantial differences the desire of both Karamzin and
Hrushevs'kyi to draw a direct and unambiguous connection between Kievan Rus' and their respective nations may be seen as a response to their need to ease anxiety about a state without a long and well-attested past. Both were seeking in their histories to impart the sense of ontological security that comes with established historical precedents. The quest for such security, as a means of creating a strong identity, is reflected in the way in which many national narratives are constructed. 15 From the point of view of many Russians the terms Ukraine-Rus' and Rus'-Ukraine are highly provocative, in just the same way that the identification of Russia with Rus' provokes the ire of many Ukrainians. It should be remembered that Rus' represents more than just a medieval state: it also signifies a sacred space, where the pivotal event of the official acceptance of Christianity took place. 16 For that reason it holds a special place in both nationalist ideologies, Russian and Ukrainian, making their compatibility difficult to achieve.
In each ideology the turning point of 988 is transformed into the baptism of one nation, This is a great, significant event both for Moscow and for all our country and all our compatriots. The new monument is a tribute of respect to our outstanding forebear. To a particularly esteemed saint, statesman and warrior, the spiritual founder of the state of Russia.
17
In reply Poroshenko countered with the following remarks:
In the Kremlin, beside the unburied Vladimir Lenin, they have unveiled a monument to our Kievan Prince Volodymyr. Yet another demonstration of the appropriation, the hybrid appropriation of history.
18
That such an exchange should take place at the highest levels of government cannot Given the claims of the Catholic Church to be universal and supranational, it is striking to discover the extent to which the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in its public profile identifies explicitly with the cause of Ukrainian nationalism. Its public discourse is filled with references to the nationalist struggle, and the published comments of prominent hierarchs frequently focus on nationalist issues. 20 See, for example, the statements of the recently deceased elder statesman of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Cardinal
Liubomyr Huzar, whose commentary on current events constituted a significant aspect of the Church's public profile. As a member of the influential action group Pershohohrudnia [December the First], his views were widely disseminated through the group's website. If any doubts exist about the importance of historical myths, they disappear when one examines references to the past in the contemporary political discourse in Russia and
Ukraine. Consider, for example, recent legislation passed by the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, on 9 April, 2015 that prohibits the display and publication of Nazi and Soviet symbols and propaganda, and also bans public criticism of the activities of two wellknown Ukrainian nationalist organizations that fought for independence during the Soviet period. 23 In the course of the struggle both organizations were responsible for serious criminal acts: these are also subject to the ban on negative comment.
The legislation was strongly criticized in an open letter to the President of Ukraine, signed by sixty four prominent historians and intellectuals, both foreign and Ukrainian.
Originally written in English, the letter was published in Ukrainian translation on the blog of What makes the open letter significant in the context of the present discussion is that it highlights the contrast between the political and expedient, on the one hand, and the academic and self-reflective, on the other. Yet both politicians and scholars generally claim to serve the interests of the nation. What distinguishes the two groups is often the interpretation they place on the character of those interests.
In the open letter to the President of Ukraine the signatories point to anomalies and contradictions inherent in the legislation. They argue that while the criminal acts of some Ukrainian nationalists, including ethnic cleansing of Poles, and crimes committed in collaboration with the Nazi occupiers of Ukraine, must now be overlooked, the service of millions of Ukrainians in the Red Army fighting against the Nazis must also be ignored.
What the historians and intellectuals are seeking is a democratic, united Ukraine, where the laws of the country promote tolerance and respect for all the ethnic groups that make up its diverse population. Their great concern is the erosion of freedom of speech.
[The] content and the spirit [of these laws] contravene one of the basic political rights-the right to freedom of speech. In the case of their acceptance serious questions will arise in relation to the observance by Ukraine of the principles of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and a series of treaties and agreements, ratified by Ukraine since gaining independence in 1991. 24 Among the signatories to the open letter is the prominent and highly regarded 
Conclusions
From what has been said above some important conclusions need to be drawn. It must be concluded that unexamined and possibly unstated historical myths can exert a powerful influence on the world-views of politicians and policy-makers, and have the potential to exacerbate conflict and intensify hostility between opposing sides. It must also be concluded that the ways in which distinct languages create semantic differences do not always show congruence, even if the languages are closely related, and that such incongruence must be taken into account if the arguments of the opposing sides are to be understood. None of these conclusions is trivial.
In the particular case of the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine it should be observed from the evidence presented above that the Russian and Ukrainian historical myths that are relevant to this conflict (in the sense that they offer distinct and opposing interpretations of the political and religious past and can easily be exploited to support one side in opposition to the other) are structurally very similar: one set of myths appears as the mirror image of the other (with important corresponding labels exchanged), a symmetry that only strengthens the power of these myths to generate inflamed confrontation. Each set of myths underpins a nationalist ideology that is the isomorphic reflection of the nationalist ideology supported by the other set, and so constructs a national identity that challenges and contests the identity defined by the other set. The two sets present mutually exclusive narratives that cannot be reconciled. Even the public rhetoric of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church relating to the conflict is linked structurally in the same way to the rhetoric of the Orthodox Church: one is the isomorphic reflection of the other. In both cases there is tension between support for the cause of nationalism and the claims of universality and catholicity.
At the same time it needs to be stressed that, while any scholarly discussion of these historical myths must strive, by convention, to adhere to the principles of rational inquiry, the arguments in Russia and in Ukraine about the issues they raise do not usually follow the same principles. For in Russia and Ukraine it is primarily a matter of belief: the myths are apprehended emotionally, not rationally, even if those engaged in the arguments fail to recognize the nature of their attachment to the past. This is not fundamentally a rational debate: what is at stake is nothing less than the identities of the participants and their sense of ontological security. Hence the closed axiological approach and fixed interpretations that are typical of much of the discussion. Yet when the myths are subjected to critical analysis, they yield to a more moderate and less exclusive form of nationalism. No longer is the nation defined primarily as those belonging to a single eponymous ethnic group, but rather as those who qualify for citizenship. So that any theory of nationalism that aims for explanatory adequacy must allow for the existence of a spectrum of nationalisms that maintain distinct and sometimes conflicting views of what constitutes a particular nation. 26 If we wish to examine these historical myths and the confrontation in Eastern
Ukraine within a wider context, we can well consider them in the context of a Jungian interpretation, since Jung offered valuable and illuminating insights into the nature of international conflict and its underlying causes, and these have relevance to the current hostilities. Jung was commenting specifically on the Cold War which was raging at the time when he made his observations and was the subject of much intense public discussion.
According to Jung, each of the protagonists in the Cold War was unwittingly motivated (at a deep level) by recognition of its own undesirable shadow in the opposing side. (The shadow represents the repressed elements that are found in the unconscious mind of an individual and in the collective unconscious of groups, including nation states.) 27 In the case of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine a similar observation can be made: each protagonist perceives its unwanted shadow in the other side and is provoked by this recognition to hostility towards the other side. The hostility is further strengthened through an appeal to historical myths that can easily be read as profoundly negative and antagonistic towards an implicit opponent. If
Jung provides the basis for this interpretation, he also offers a possible way through the impasse.
28
Though Jung's writings on the shadow and the unconscious mind are very persuasive and remain influential in the study of the human condition, his ideas cannot be proved in the conventional scientific manner (as Jung himself would acknowledge). They bring to the discussion of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine an element of speculation. As an addendum we must point out that even without the benefit of a Jungian interpretation it can be argued strongly that the exploitation of historical myths on each side in the dispute, given their character and structural similarity, creates a powerful barrier to mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation between the opposing sides. For that reason alone these myths deserve investigation and explication. 
